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Abstract 
A simple but adequate analytical framework is provided to define the 
relationship between planetary quarantine requirements and estimated prob- 
abilities of planet contamination. Emphasis is placed on the form in which 
the requirements are ts be stated so as not to constrain their implementation 
unnecessarily. Specific numerical values for the requirements are given, 
based on an assumed set of values for the "judgment factors" which enter into 
the analyticalmodel. Alternate sets of requirements are compared and discussed. 
A detailed definition of nomenclature is provided to encourage standard- 
. . -  ization of future analysis in this area. 
* Prepared under contract NASw-1340 for the NASA Office of Biosciences. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
In the nomenclature defined below, the following symbol categories are used: 
(a) Capital P will denote a probability of planetary contamination 
(b) Lower case p will denote an event probability which is a component of 
a planetary contamination probability (P). 
(c) Prime superscripts, e.g. P or  p‘ , will  denote probabilities relating 
to unsterilized organisms. ?he absence of a prime thus denotes probabilities 
relating to organisms which have undergone sterilization. 
n - number of lander vehicles launched over the time-period under 
consideration. These landers wi l l  be sterilized in their entirety 
prior to launch. 
nu - number of unsteiilized biszs, orbiters znb fljj-bys k ~ i x h e b  over 
the time -period under consideration. 
P - probability that any one landing vehicle, i.e. any one of the n ‘s will  
contaminate the planet o r  its atmosphere. L 
P‘ - probability that any one of the unsterilized buses, orbiters, o r  
fly-bys, i.e. any one of the n ’s will  contaminate the planer o r  
its atmosphere. U 
P - probability that the planet wil l  be contaminated during the time- 
period under consideration. C 
- probability that one viable organism in a lander previously sub- 
jected to heat sterilization, wi l l  be present on the planet surface 
or in its atmosphere. 
PP 
p’p - probability that one o r  more viable organisms not previously 
heat stailized will  be present on the planet surface or in its 
atmosphere. 
- probability that a viable, but previously heat sterilized, organism 
present on the p h e t  surface will  grow and spread so as to contamin- 
ate the planet or its atmosphere. 
PG 
P‘G - probability that the one o r  more viable organisms which have not previously been heat sterilized and are  present on the planet surface 
or  in its atmosphere, w i l l  grow and spread and contaminate the planet 
o r  its atmosphere. 
2 
- probability that one organism in a lander vehicle wi l l  remain viable 
after heat sterilization and transit to the planet. PN 
- probability that a viable organism if present in a sterilized lander will 
be released onto the planet surface. PR 
N - number of viable organisms in a lander after heat sterilization. 
No - number of viable organisms in a lander prior to heat sterilization. 
t - heat sterilization time 
D - time to reduce population of viable organisms by a factor of 10 at the 
selected sterilization temperature. 
N' - number of viable organisms on an unsterilized spacecraft, o r  portions 
0 thereof, at the time it reaches a position to become a contamination 
hazard. 
X' - number of viable organisms from an unsterilized spacecraft whichre 
deposited on the planet surface o r  in its atmosphere. 
p;' - probability that one or more viable, but previously unsterilized organisms 
will be transferred from a bus, orbiter, o r  fly-by to the planet or its 
atmosphere. 
pIR - probability that viable, but previously unsterilized organisms transferred 
to the planet will be released onto the planet surface or  into its atmosphere. 
p tN - probability of one viable organism not previously heat sterilized, on that 
planet surface or  in its atmosphere. 
Note: N and p refer to organisms on a lander prior to release (with prob- 
ability p,) onto theplanet surface or  its atmosphere. However, N' 
and p' refer to organisms after release (with probability p' ) onto the 
planersurface or  into its atmosphere. 
N 
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ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
A simple analytical framework can be established on the basis of the 
following: 
(1) planetary contamination probabilities due to any one vehicle will 
be much smaller than 1. 
(2) the above probabilities will be taken to be constant for all the 
cases iil any one category over the time -period under consideration. 
Using the nomenclature previously defined, we  can write: 
= n  P + n  P' 
pc L u 
We can further define P and P' as follows: 
P = p p .  pG 
P'=C@;, .  p& 
i 
Equation 3 is written as a sum of i terms to allow for the various sources 
of planetary Contamination involving unsterilized organisms, recognizing that 
different values of p' and / o r  p' may be associated with each case. ?he 
cases included in this category are  (1) accidental impact of the entire unsteril- 
ized vehicle (2) contamination due to ejecta from the unsterilized vehicle (3) con- 
tamination due to emissions from the unsterilized vehicle (4) recontamination of 
a sterilized lander, and other sources of contamination which may come to light 
in future investigations. 
F G 
It is to be noted that p and p' become mission design requirements for 
p and 
P P 
landers and unsterilized vehicles, once specific values of P , nL, n 
p' are accepted. These requirements are further defined 
lowing component probabilities. 
consisybf %e fol- G 
- Pp 'P" PR 
P;=P;- P i  
(4) 
(5) 
Equations 4 and 5 are essentially operational equations, for use in im- 
plementing mission requirements. Each of the terms on the right hand 
side would be suitably expanded to represent the particular case being 
analyzed, e.g. p for heat cycle specifications, p' for contamination due to N T ejecta, etc. 
Most, and probably all, analyses performed to date on planetary con- 
tamination probabilities and related mission requirements, can be reduced 
to the sirr?le framewcrk defined above without loss in the accuracy of 
predictkU AJAamary contamination probabilities. This applies to the Sagan- 
1 
Coleman analysis which provided the basis for the evolution zf ea3ier  
planetary quarantine requirements. 
C 
The complete equation for planetary contamination probability can 
be written as follows where each variable is identified by a brief title: 
/ / /  
probability of growth and spreading I L  
L probability of release on planet 
I probability of transfer to planet 
!- number of unsterilized vehicles 
5 
DEFINITION OF OUARANTINE REOUIREMENTS 
U as representing a desirable p a l  for the prevention of planetary contamination 
during unmanned exploration of Mars : 
Referring to equation 1, we  adopt the following values for P , nL and n 
C 
P < lo-'; n L =  70; n = 30 
C U 
The above choices define a probability of planetary contamination of less 
than 1/1,000 for 100 vehicle launches to Mars. The division of the total number 
of vehicles into 70 landers and 30 unsterilized buses, orbiter and fly-bys . 
does not d g p  a unique division of the total allowable contamination probability 
Of P < lo between P and P' . Specific choices of P and P' are properly left 
as system trade-off parameters. However, the selection of n and n places 
an upper b i t  on P and P' . For, clearly, P or  P' can not be hosen  to be less 
than zero. Hence, 
C 
U 
P' < 3.33 x 10-5 
-5 
P < 1.43 x 10 
It is also necessary to assign specific values to p and p' in order to remove G G these judgment factors from the domain of engineering implementation of quarantine 
requirement. We adopt a value of 
-3 p G =  10 
as a suitable probability of growth and spreading due to one viable organism 
which, although viable, has pwiously been subjected to heat sterilization. 
For the case of viable organisms from unsterilized vehicles, it should 
be noted that to accomodate the various possible sources of hazard, it w a s  
necessary to define p' as the probability of "one or  more" organisms on the 
planet surface, It is therefore also necessary to relate p' to the number of 
viable, but unsterilized organisms ultimately released onto the planet surface 
(or its atmosphere) in any one of the i events being considered. We thus adopt 
the following values: 
P 
G 
When N' 2 100 "=1 
P b  -- 
When N c 1  p;lr=p& 10 
-2 
-2 
- 16 N' < 100 = N '  10 When 
The last of the above cases merely expresses the fact that when a 
calculation yields Nz <1, the value of N'\ is assumed equal to the probability 
of having one viable survivor. This is analagous to the procedure 
extrapolating survivor curves in heat sterilization to a probability 
used in 
of one survivor. 
It is to be noted that when large numbers of viable organisms are 
anticipated, Le.  100 or more, the probability of growth and spreading is 
taken to be unity. For small numbers, the comparison is most conveniently 
made for the case of one survivor. Thus, when N' = 1, we use a value of -2 
to reflect the estimate that an organism not previously subjected to heat 
sterilization is more likely to grow in the Martian environment. 
= 10 which is one order ofmagnitude larger than p This is intended 
p;; G' 
The choice of parameters made constrains the possible values of 
pp and pi .  With regard to the probabilities of release p 
ted that m most instances they would at first be taken to%, unity. However, - 
their evaluation is amenable to engineering analysis and may,& specific 
instances, be reliably demonstrated to be less than unity. These parameters 
are therefore considered to belong to the implementation process along with 
and p' it is to be expec- R' 
PN and P;. 
In terms of the values adopted above, planetary reqtiirements would be 
given by the following: 
(1) Planetary contamination probabiiities (equation 1): 
70P i 3OP'G 
0.7 P +0.3 P'< lo-' 
(2) Sterilized landers (equation 2): 
o r  
-3 
P P = l O  p 
or 
(8) 
3 pp = 10 P 
As previously noted, regara-ys of the allocation made between P and P i  
P cannot be greater than 1.43 x 10 . Hence, pp wi l l  be less than 1.43 x 10- . 
The exact value w i l l  depend on the relative difficulty of achieving requirements 
for sterilized and unsterilized vehicles, effects of allocation choices on mission 
success probabilities and other mission design considerations. 
(3) Unsterilized vehicles (equation 3) 
In view of the need to provide for the different modes of contamination by 
unsterilized organisms, a simple statement for this requirement camot be made, 
It must thus be &fined in terms of equation 3 and the values of p',given herein. 
We note however, that P' wi l l  in any event be less than 3.33dO 5?c11e exact 
value depending on the allocation betweenP andP' as discussed above. 
7 
. 
To illustrate the application of require r,ts for unsterilized vehicles, 
consider the following specific cases: 
(a) Accidental impact of the entire vehicle. 
The probability of transfer p' is in this case the probability of 
accidental impact of the entire vebcle. Since the number of organisms 
on board is >>lo0 and the probability of releaseapi, is unity (crash landing) 
p' would be taken as unity. G 
(b) Ejecta due to meteoroid impact. 
T 
p; would, in this case, denote the probability that ejecta from the 
spacecraft will reach the plmet o r  its atmosphere. p' would represent 
the probability of releasing viable organisms from the ejecta. Before 
selecting p' it will  be necessary to estimate how many of the organisms 
transferrefare likely to be released onto the planet surface or  its 
atmosphere. Tiis wi l l  depend upon rhe number originally present and the 
physical mechanism of ejection from the vehicle, transfer to the planet 
and release of viable organisms from the ejecta. 
(c) Emission inatltitude control jets. , 
R 
l 
I 
I 
~ 
are different. Thus, p' is again the probability that reaction-jet p~trticles I 
I 
This case is analogous to ejecta except that the physical mechanisms 
containing one or more viable orgainsms wi l l  be transferred to the planet. 
The probability of release of or,o;aisms from the particles may ingeneral 
be close to unity. However, it may be found that only a small number of 
viable organisms can reach the planet surface or its atmosphere. Indeed, 
T 
calculations may show that there is a probability of less than unity that 
one such organism wi l l  ultimately be deposited on the planet, even though 
the probability that some part of the attitude control jet gas wi l l  be trans- 
ferred to the planet is near unity. A relatively smaller number for p' would 
be calculated in this case, as previously specified, so as to properly 
reflect the contribution of this source of hazard to the overall contamination 
probability. 
G 
F 
DISCUSSION 
A major difference between the requirements as described in the pre- 
ceding section and current quarantine standards is in the format in which 
they are formulated. ?he relatively simple form used earlier, i.e. the 
definition of a required p and a single value of p' (referred to as the impact 
program. R&quirements as described herein are better suited to current 
needs in that - 
probability P.), w a s  appropriate N to the early phases T of the planetary quarantine 
(1) they do not unnecessarily constrain mission planning since the 
allocation of contamination probabilities between landers and unsteril- 
ized vehicles is, within specified bounds, left to trade-off studies 
appropriate to the agency called upon to implement f A e  program; 
(2) they take into account the various modes of contamination due to 
unsterilized vehicles and define constraints appropriate to those modes; 
(3) parameters which are amenable to engineering analysis, i. e., p and 
p k  a s  not eliminated from continuing evaluations by a priori spec&cations 
as part of the quarantine requirements. 
Tn addition, the requirements described herein make use of updated 
- 
numerical values of n 
factors. 
and p to reflect current consensus on these judgment L' G 
To make a more detailed comparison, it would be necessary to reduce 
the general requirements described herein to a specific case which would be 
analogous to earlier considerations. To do this, we assume that the only 
possible mode of contamination from unsterilized vehicles is that of accidental 
impact by the entire vehicle. Table I shows resulting values of the various 
parameters for two cases using the present model. Case (a) (item 4 of 
Table I) assumes the same distributions benveen P and P' as was  used in 
items 1, 2 and 3. Case (b) (item 5 )  shows a distribution which favors un- 
sterilized vehicles by a factor of 31. Data for the Sagan and Coleman 
analysis (item 1) have been taken from the article published in the May 1965 
issue ofAeronautics and Astronautics (p. 22). Item (2) of Table I represents 
a correction in the Sagan and Coleman data stemming from a minor e r ror  in 
their numerical calculations. As regards the COSPAR values, only p and 
p' are formally provided in COSPAR resolutions. The other values in item 3 
are therefore inferred on the assumption that they have been &rived from the 
Sagan - Coleman analysis. 
N 
T 
It is evident from Table I that in all cases the requirement on accidental 
impact p' is essentially the same. To affect this parameter it would be necessary 
to reconsider the value of planetary contamination probability P . T 
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The rationale for favoring unsteri’’ vehicles by a factor of 34 as is 
3. Assumethatp isgivenby done is case (b), may be illustrated as 
the exponential population reduction frc:ai;L 3 a constant temperature N 
Where D is the time required to I 
90% and t is the sterilization time (at a 
t denote the re ed sterilization timi .spending to case (a) in Table I, 
1.e. .a p = 7xlO-??t is readily calculatei, l i om equation (9) that if N = 10 8 , 
N 0 
the population of a single species by 
.nt sterilization temperature). Let 
= 0.084 o r  8.4% ‘i-ta 
ta 
An 8.4 % increase in sterilization time, say from 18.3 hours to 19.8 hours, 
is not too Significant from the point of view of implementation since margins larger 
than t h i s  must generally be allowed h setticg engheerbg reqaizeme~ts for heat 
sterilizable hardware, i.e. a piece of spacecraft equipment would not be usable 
duration of the stress due to heat sterilization. However, as shown in Table I, 
case (b) represents an increase by a factor of 1.82 in the allocationfor unsterilized 
vehicles (p?, a number which must be distributed among many different sources 
of contamination on any one vehicle, e. g. ejecta, emissions, lander recontamination, 
trajectory bias, etc. fn some instances, the availability of this margin in unster- 
ilized vehicle requirements may avoid the need for -mecessarily considering 
sterilization of portions of an otherwise unsterilized vehicle. 
if its performance and reliability were to depend upon an 8.4% change in the A 
It is to be noted that implementation of requirements for sterilized landers 
involves parameters shown, in an illustrative manner, in equation 9, i.e. No, 
t and D. No and t are largely independent of the considerations which enter into 
the formulation of planetary quarantine requirements. However, this is not the case 
for D. In general, D defines the resistance of a specific species to heat sterilization 
and its numerical value must be obtained in the laboratory using a particular 
recovery (culture) medium to test for viability after the application of heat. The 
question thus arises as to which culture medium is most appropriate, since, 
clearly, different D values would he obtained depending upon the medium used. 
G The only available guideline is the value which is selected for p . Since p represents the probability that an organism previously subjectegto heat steril- 
ization will grow on the surface of Mars or  in its atmosphere (and spread over 
a significant portion of the planet), the culnire medium used to establish the D 
values must represent our estimate of the most favorable growth conditions 
possibly existing on Mars .  Specifically, wP$n choosing a culture medium we 
would be estimating that there is,say, a 10- probability, i.e: a small but finite 
probability that an  organism released from the lander will find a growth medium 
on Mars  equivalent to that of the laboratory culture medium which has been selekted. 
11 
siwance of B s 
r-tic;n o f  the p h e t f .  the culture medium used to establish the D 
.m urgpnism relcs-sed from the landcr wil l  find a grow& medium 
